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Abstrat
Safety-ritial systems need to maintain their funtion-
ality in the presene of multiple errors aused by ompo-
nent failures or disastrous environment events. We propose
a game-theoreti foundation for synthesizing ontrol strate-
gies that maximize the resiliene of a software system in
defense against a realisti error model. The new ontrol
objetive of suh a game is alled k-resiliene. In order to
be k-resilient, a system needs to rapidly reover from in-
nitely many waves of a small number of up to k lose er-
rors provided that the bloks of up to k errors are separated
by short time intervals, whih an be used by the system to
reover. We rst argue why we believe this to be the right
level of abstration for safety ritial systems when loal
faults are few and far between. We then show how the anal-
ysis of k-resiliene problems an be formulated as a model-
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heking problem of a mild extension to the alternating-time
-alulus (AMC). The witness for k resiliene, whih an
be provided by the model heker, an be used for providing
ontrol strategies that are optimal with respet to resiliene.
We show that the omputational omplexity of onstruting
suh optimal ontrol strategies is low and demonstrate the
feasibility of our approahh through an implementation and
experimental results.
1 Introdution
Today's software systems an onsist of tens of million
lines of ode. Suh a system may interat with hundreds
of distributed proesses that are reated and destroyed dy-
namially in an evolving environment. With suh a sale of
omplexity and unpreditability, users and developers have
learned to deal with the reality that software systems most
likely still ontain defets after delivery. In fat, various
empirial studies show that the defet density of ommer-
ial software systems varies from 1 to 20 defets in every
1000 lines of soure ode [41℄. Programmers and software
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designers have developed many engineering tehniques to
ontain the damage that ould be aused by suh defets.
For example, when observing that a ritial servie request
is not aknowledged, a software system may have several
measures to its disposal to avoid system failure, inluding
resending the request, resetting the server, learing the om-
muniation buffers, et. But, in general, it is difult to
estimate how to organize the measures for the maximal re-
siliene of the system against realisti errors. At the mo-
ment, an automated support for the synthesis of ontrol
mehanism to defend a system against software errors is
missing. Suh an automated support, if available, an sug-
gest defense tehniques against software defets to develop-
ment teams, and help these development teams to identify
the vulnerabilities of software systems. We use a game-
theoreti approah to study this aspet and have arried out
experiments to observe how our tehniques an be used in
synthesizing the most resilient defense of software systems
against multiple errors.
Intuitively, the defensive strength of a software system
should be proportional to the number of errors that it an
endure. A subtle issue in designing the foundation is the re-
alisti assumption on how many errors a system an endure
before running into disasters. Apparently, no non-trivial
system an endure an unlimited ood of errors without de-
grading to inevitable system failure. Thus, if we do not em-
ploy a realisti error model, then no meaningful analysis of
the resiliene level of these systems to software errors an
proeed, and no pratial ontrol mehanism an be devised
to defend them against errors. We are interested in fending
the system against a more restrited error model, but still
want to provide the error model with a quantiable level of
power in order to be able to defend the system against many
error senarios.
Considering that most software systems have a life-time
muh longer than the duration needed for a reasonably de-
signed software system to reover from an error, a reason-
able foundation needs to take the differene between these
two time sales into aount. In this work, we propose to
evaluate ontrol mehanism of software systems on how
many errors the ontrol an endure before reovery to safe
behavior. We then present an algorithm to synthesize a on-
trol strategy that an endure the maximal number of suh
errors.
Before proeeding further, let us standardize the basi
terms. In embedded systems, a design defet in software
or hardware is alled a fault. Different to a fault, an er-
ror (sometimes alled omponent failure in the literature)
is the effet of a fault that results in a differene between
the expeted and the atual behavior of a system, e.g., mea-
surement errors, read/write errors, et. An error does not
neessarily lead to a system failure, but may instead be re-
paired by, e.g., a defense mehanism in the software. That
is, an error may be deteted and orreted/neutralized be-
fore it reates any harm to the whole system or its users.
Only when the effet of an error reates faulty behaviors
that an be observed by the users, it beomes a failure.
Our spei goal is to develop a tehnique for synthe-
sizing a ontrol mehanism of a software system against
the maximal number of dense errors without degrading to
failure. We took our inspiration from methods for resilient
avioni systems [39℄, where fault tolerane is designed to
reover from a bounded number of errors. The number of
errors a system needs to tolerate an be inferred from the
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k 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 : : :
k errors 0:865 0:594 0:333 0:143 0:053 0:017 0:005 : : :
k dense errors 0:865 2  10
 4
2  10
 9
2  10
 14
2  10
 19
2  10
 24
2  10
 29
: : :
Table 1. Probabilities of k dense errors
given maximal duration of a ight and the mean time be-
tween errors of the individual omponents. To demonstrate
the differene between the objetive to tolerate up to k er-
rors and sequenes of separated bloks of up to k dense er-
rors in a short period, we exemplify the quality guarantees
one obtains for a system (e.g., an airplane) with an operat-
ing time of 20 hours and a mean time between exponentially
distributed errors of 10 hours, assuming a repair time of 3.6
seonds. The mean time between dense errors (onseu-
tive errors before system reovery) is alulated in Table 1.
The gures for k errors (omponent failures) are simply the
values for the Poisson distribution with oefient 2. To
explain the gures for k dense errors, onsider the density
of 2 dense errors ourring in lose suession. If an error
ours, the hane that the next error ours within the re-
pair time (3.6 seonds) is approximately
1
10000
. The goal to
tolerate an arbitrary number of up to k-dense errors is, of
ourse, muh harder than the goal of tolerating up to k er-
rors, but, as the example shows, the number k an be muh
smaller. Tolerating an arbitrary number of errors (with a
distane of at least 3:6 seonds between them) reates the
same likelihood to result in a system failure as tolerating up
to 9 errors overall, and tolerating up to 15 errors still results
in a 70% higher likelihood of a system failure than toler-
ating bloks of up to 2 errors in this example. Only errors
for whih this is the ase ould ause a system failure. The
mean time between bloks of two dense errors is therefore
not ten hours, but 100,000 hours. Likewise, it inreases to
1,000,000,000 (one billion) hours for bloks of three dense
errors, and so forth. Maximizing the number of dense errors
that are permitted before full reovery is therefore a natu-
ral design goal. After full reovery, the system is allowed
again the same number of errors. Now, if the mean time
between errors (MTBE) is huge ompared to the time the
system needs to fully reover, then the mean time between
system failures (MTBF) grows immensely.
We view the problem of designing a resilient ontrol
mehanism towards dense errors as a two-player game,
alled safety resiliene game, between the system (protago-
nist
1
, `he' for onveniene) and a hostile agent (antagonist
2
,
`she' for onveniene) that injets errors into the system un-
der exeution. The protagonist wants to keep the system
from failure in the presene of errors, while the antagonist
wants to derail the system to failure. Speially, system
designers may model their system, defense mehanism, and
error model as a nite game graph. The nodes in the graph
represent system states. These system states are partitioned
into three lasses: the safe states, the failure states, and the
reovery states. Some transitions are labeled with errors
while others are onsidered normal transitions. The game
is played with respet to a resiliene level k. If a play ever
enters a failure state, then the antagonist wins in the play.
Otherwise, the protagonist wins.
The protagonists plays by seleting a move, intuitively
1
In game theory, a protagonist sometimes is also alled player 1.
2
In game theory, an antagonist sometimes is also alled player 2.
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the `normal' event that should happen next (unless an er-
ror is injeted). The antagonist an then deide to trigger
an error transition (injeting an error) with the intention to
eventually deet the system into a failure state. Our error
model, however, restrits the antagonist to injet at most k
errors before she allows for a long period of time that the
system may use to reover to the safe states. (If the an-
tagonist deides to use less than k errors, the protagonist
does not know about this. It proves that this information is
not required, as we will show that the protagonist an play
memoryless.) After full reovery by the protagonist to the
safe states, the antagonist is allowed again to injet the same
number of errors, and so forth.
If the system an win this game, then the system is alled
k-resilient. For k-resilient systems, there exists a ontrol
strategyeven one that does not use memoryto make the
system resilient in the presene of bloks of up to k dense
errors. We argue that, if the omponentMTBF is huge om-
pared to the time the system needs to fully reover, then the
expeted time for system breakdown grows immensely.
Besides formally dening safety resiliene games, we
also present algorithms for answering the following ques-
tions.
 Given an integer k, a set F of failure states, and a
set S of safe states (disjoint from F ), is there a re-
overy mehanism that an endure up to k dense er-
rors, effetively avoid entering F , and quikly diret
the system bak to S. Sometimes, the system design-
ers may have designated parts of the state spae for the
reovery mehanism. The answer to this question thus
also impliitly tells whether the reovery mehanism
is fully funtional in the reovery proess.
 Given an integer k and the set of failure states, what
is the maximal set of safe states, for whih the sys-
tem has a strategy to maintain k-resiliene? In game
theory, this means that safety resiliene games an be
used for synthesizing safety regions for a given bound
on onseutive errors before the system is fully reov-
ered.
The question an be extended to not only partition the
states into safety, reovery, and failure states, but also
for providing memoryless ontrol on the safety and re-
overy states.
 Given a set of failure states, what is the maximal re-
siliene level of the system that an be ahieved with
proper ontrol? We argue that this maximal resiliene
level is a well-dened and plausible indiator of the
defense strength of a ontrol mehanism against a re-
alisti error model.
With our tehnique, software engineers and system design-
ers an fous on maximizing the number of dense errors that
the system an tolerate innitely often, providing that they
are grouped into bloks that are separated by a short period
of time, whih is sufient for reovery.
We investigate how to analyze the game with existing
tehniques. We present an extension to alternating-time
-alulus (AMC) and propose to use the AMC model-
heking algorithm on onurrent games to hek resiliene
levels of embedded systems. We present redution from
safety resiliene games to AMC formulas and onurrent
game strutures. Then we present a PTIME algorithm for
answering whether the system an be ontrolled to tolerate
up to a given number of dense errors. The algorithm an
then be used to nd the maximal resiliene level that an
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be ahieved of the system. The evaluation is onstrutive: it
provides a ontrol strategy for the protagonist, whih an be
used to ontrol a system to meet this predened resiliene
level.
The remainder of the artile is organized as follows. Se-
tion 2 reviews some standard terminology and results. Se-
tion 3 outlines our work and motivates it on three examples.
Setion 4 denes safety resiliene game. Setion 5 denes
a variation of the alternating-time -alulus (AMC) for
speifying our k-resiliene properties. Setion 6 presents
our resiliene level evaluation algorithm. We report on
our implementation and the experimental evaluation of our
tehniques in Setion 7. Setion 8 reviews related work.
Finally, Setion 9 summarizes the work.
2 Two-player onurrent game strutures
To failitate our explanation of resiliene analysis in a
game's perspetive, we start by reviewing the game on-
epts related to our work. A onurrent game may involve
several players, who make onurrent move deisions at the
same time during transitions. The destination of a transition
is jointly determined by the moves hosen by all players.
Suh a gamemodel is very expressive and handy in desrib-
ing interations in a omplex system. In this work, we adapt
the nite onurrent games from [3℄ with event onepts on
transitions. For the analysis of system resiliene, we only
have to onsider two players in the game, the rst is the
system, and the seond is the error model.
Denition 1 (2-player onurrent game stru-
ture): A onurrent game struture is a tuple
K = hQ; r; P; ; E
1
; E
2
; Æi, where
 Q is a nite set of states.
 r is the initial state in Q.
 P is a nite set of atomi propositions.
  : Q 7! 2
P
is a proposition-labeling funtion of the
states.
 E
1
and E
2
are nite sets of move symbols that the
protagonist and the antagonist an respetively hoose
in transitions. A pair in E
1
 E
2
is alled a move
vetor.
 Æ is a funtion that maps fromQE
1
E
2
toQ. Æ is
alled the transition funtion and oneptually spe-
ies a suessor state that results from a state and
moves of the players.
Given a state q 2 Q and a vetor [e
1
; e
2
℄ 2 E
1
 E
2
,
Æ(q; e
1
; e
2
) is the suessor state from q when eah player
a 2 f1; 2g hooses her respetive move e
a
. 
We prefer to represent the moves available to the play-
ers by symbols (rather than integers as in [3℄), as move (or
event) symbols an be used to reet some physial mean-
ing. For example, a move an orrespond to the turning-off
of a swith, the detetion of an airplane, or the exeution of
an error handling routine. (Tehnially, representing moves
as either integers or symbols does, of ourse, make no dif-
ferene.)
For onveniene, we assume that we are in the on-
text of a given 2-player onurrent game struture K =
hQ; r; P; ; E
1
; E
2
; Æi. In the following, we review some
standard onepts from game theory.
Denition 2 (Plays and play prexes): A play prex  of
length h is a sequene q
0
;
 !
e
0
; q
1
;
 !
e
1
; : : : ; q
h 1
that alter-
nates between states and move vetors (starting and end-
ing in a state), suh that, for all i 2 [0; h), Æ(q
i
;
 !
e
i
) =
q
i+1
holds. Similarly, a play  is an innite sequene
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q0
;
 !
e
0
; q
1
;
 !
e
1
; q
2
;
 !
e
2
; : : : that alternates between states and
move vetors (starting and ending in a state), suh that
Æ(q
i
;
 !
e
i
) = q
i+1
holds.
In both ases, we use (i) = q
i
and 
e
(i) =
 !
e
i
by abuse
of notation. 
The following notations are for the ease of presentation.
Given a play prex  = q
0
;
 !
e
0
; q
1
;
 !
e
1
: : : q
h 1
, we denote
the length of , h, by jj. For plays, we write jj = 1.
Given two integers j and h in [0; jj) with j  h, we use
[j; h℄ to denote the play prex (j); 
e
(j); 
e
(j+1); (j+
1); : : : ; (h). For play prexes , we use last()
def
= (jj  
1) to denote the last state in .
We may also use regular expressions to represent sets of
play prexes. Speially, given two sets A and B of play
prexes,AB represents the set of onatenation of play pre-
xes 
1

2
suh that 
1
2 A and 
2
2 B. A

then represents
nite onatenation of play prexes from A. For example,
a; ab; ababbb are all elements of fa; b; ag

.
Please reall that a play has innite length. A play 
with (0) = q is alled a q-play. When hoosing moves at
a state, a player may look up the play prex that leads to
the urrent state, investigate what deisions the other play-
ers have made along the prex, and selet his or her next
move. Suh deision-making by a player an be aptured
by a strategy.
Denition 3 (Strategy) A strategy is a funtion from nite
play prexes to a move symbol. Formally, a strategy 
a
for
a player a 2 f1; 2g is a funtion from play prexes to E
a
.
The next state after a play prex  2
 
Q(E
1
 E
2
)


Q is
determined as Æ(last(); 
1
(); 
2
()).
A strategy  ismemoryless (positional) if the hoie of 
only relies on the urrent state, that is, if, for every two play
prexes  and 
0
, last() = last(
0
) implies () = (
0
).
If  is not memoryless, it is alled memoryful. 
Given regular expressions [24℄ 
1
; : : : ; 
n
with alpha-
bet Q and move symbols e
1
; : : : ; e
n
2 E, we may use
[
1
7! e
1
; : : : ; 
n
7! e
n
℄ to (partially) speify a strat-
egy. For a strategy , a rule like 
i
7! e
i
means that,
for every play prex  2 
i
, () = e
i
. To disam-
biguate the interpretation of the strategy, a rule with in-
dex i superedes all rules with indies > i. Moreover,
to make a strategy omplete, we may require 
n
to be
 
Q(E
1
 E
2
)


Q, the set of strings of interleaving states
and move vetors that end in a state (whih inludes the set
of all play prexes). For example, a memoryless strategy of
the protagonist an be speied with [
 
Q(E
1
E
2
)


q
0
7!
e
1
;
 
Q(E
1
 E
2
)


q
3
7! e
2
;
 
Q(E
1
 E
2
)


7! e
3
℄. A
memoryful strategy of the protagonist an be speied with
[q
0
7! e
1
;
 
Q(E
1
 E
2
)

+
q
0
7! e
2
;
 
Q(E
1
 E
2
)


q
3
7!
e
2
;
 
Q(E
1
E
2
)


Q 7! e
3
℄.
Note that, in Denition 3, we do not distinguish between
the strategies of the players. We all a play  -onform for
a strategy  of player a if, for all i 2 N, there are e
1
and e
2
with (i+ 1) = Æ((i); e
1
; e
2
) and e
a
= ().
In the remainder of the artile, we denote the set of all
strategies by  and the set of all memoryless strategies by

(0)
. Together with an initial state r, strategies 
1
; 
2
2 
of the m players respetively, dene a unique play, whih
onforms to 
1
; 
2
. We denote this play by play(r; 
1
; 
2
).
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Figure 1. Framework of resiliene design
3 Motivation
3.1 Bakground
Resiliene to errors in omputer systems is usually
ahieved through error reovery design as illustrated in Fig-
ure 1. The system states an be partitioned into three re-
gions: safe, reovery, and failure. The left part of the gure
represents the safety region. The states in this safe region
an be viewed as those for `normal' operation. When an er-
ror ours, the system goes through a reovery stage, where
it follows some reovery mehanism. This is shown as the
reovering area in Figure 1. In this region, the system
intuitively tries to repair the effets of an error and thus to
reover to the safety region.
During the reovery (or: in the reovery region), how-
ever, errors may still happen. In general, fault-tolerant sys-
tems are built under the assumption that error detetion and
reovery is speedy and that there an only be a few errors
during the proess of reovery. If the reovery mehanism
is not resilient enough, a few errors may drive the system
into failure.
We illustrate this on the following examples.
Example 1 (Fault-tolerant omputer arhitetures): In
omputer arhitetures, fault-tolerane is usually ahieved
via hardware dupliation. Consider an example of a multi-
proessor system that inludes n proessor opies and m
memory opies. The n proessors eah an follow the in-
strutions of the original system, or be engaged in memory
reovery. When a opy of the memory fails, a proessor
an be assigned to reover it. Majority hek an be used
to detet that a proessor is faulty or that memory opy is
faulty (often, both would happen at the same time). For re-
overy, we an set a free proessor to reover some memory
opy, or make a proessor follow the ode of the majority of
proessors.
The key to error resiliene is to deide whether to make a
proessor follow the exeution of the majority, or to assign
it to reover faulty memory. If too many errors our in a
short while before the errors an be reovered from, then
there may be no more proessors left to arry out any more
reovery. When suh a ritial situation arises, the system
enters failure state when another error is indued.
The reovery mehanism desribed above is typial in
the design of fault-tolerant systems [36℄. As explained, a
pratial reovery mehanism usually does not rely on the
detailed struture of the system. Instead, error-detetion
tehniques suh as parity heks, voting (for majority
heks), et., are usually employed. In fat, the number of
dupliates is usually ritial to the resiliene of the system
to errors. As long as the majority of the dupliate modules
an be reovered in time (i.e., before the next wave of er-
rors), resiliene of the system an be ahieved. 
Example 2 (Exeption handling): At the operating sys-
tem level, errors are usually signaled via interrupt lines and
handled with routines alled handlers. The rst thing that
needs to be done by a handler is to save the CPU state of
7
the interrupted proess. In some operating systems, a stati
memory spae is used for this purpose for eah handler. In
suh a sheme, if the same error happens again while ex-
euting the error handler, then the system an run into the
risk that the CPU states of the interrupted handler an be
overwritten and destroyed.
Another sheme is to use a stak to save the CPU states
of the interrupted proesses. Suh a sheme seems resilient
to errors that happen during the exeution of error han-
dlers. Still, too many errors that happen during the exe-
ution of error handlers an deny ritial funtions of the
system and inur failures, inluding missed timer updates
and priority inversions. Thus, a proper assumption on the
timely error reovery by the error handling routines is rit-
ial to the design of error resiliene in suh ases. 
Example 3 (Seurity attaks): Seurity in the Internet
also relies on resiliene to attaks of hakers, viruses, mal-
ware, et. For example, one ommon tehnique of attaks
to ommuniation modules is to overow the ommunia-
tion buffers. In suh attaks, the sizes of the buffers and the
ability of the seurity proedures to detet and reover from
suh overowing attaks is ruial to the resiliene design.

These examples show that reovery is a ruial onept
for designing systems that are resilient to errors. When sys-
tem errors are deteted in suh a system, the system ati-
vates a reoverymehanism so as to remove the effet of the
errors. When designing suh systems, the system designers
usually have in mind what errors and failures the systems
an expet, aording to the speiation. To avoid fail-
ures in the ourrene of dense errors, the system designers
usually inorporate many error reovery mehanism in the
system, e.g., exeption handlers and hardware/software re-
dundany. But, in general, it would be difult for the de-
signers to evaluate how effetive their reovery mehanism
is to dense errors. To overome this difulty, we believe
that it is important to support them with automated analyti-
al tools with a solid foundation.
Resiliene has also been used in [8, 19℄ with a similar
goal. When synthesising ode, one relies on assumptions of
the behavior of the environment, and the formal speia-
tion would only ask for the provision of guarantees under
the ondition that the assumptions are satised. When as-
sessing the quality of an implementation, the behavior in
ases where the environment does not omply with the as-
sumption matters. In [8, 19℄, the resiliene model we have
introdued in the onferene version [25℄ of this paper has
been followed up upon, and proven to be well suited for
reative synthesis.
In this work, we use these observations to design a theo-
retial framework for synthesizing a ontrol mehanism that
provides the maximal resiliene against software errors in a
realisti error model.
3.2 Resiliene in a Nutshell
From Example 1 to 3 in Subsetion 3.1, it is easy to see
the ommon paradigm of error reovery in software sys-
tems.
When errors are deteted, a reovery mehanism
will be ativated to avoid failures and try to get
bak to normal exeution.
Moreover, suh a reovery mehanism usually needs to
operate under the assumption that more errors may also hap-
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pen during the reovery proess. In pratie, system de-
signers have already implementedmany defensivemodules,
e.g., exeption handlers, whih are ertainly good andi-
dates for the reovery segments. Thus, the reovery sheme
we disuss is likely to have arisen in an ad-ho fashion as a
natural onept when software arhitets and programmers
designed reovery mehanisms for ritial software.
The vast state spaes of ritial systems make an auto-
mated support for and a solid foundation of evaluating de-
sign alternatives partiularly valuable.
In the following, we will use the examples from the pre-
vious subsetion as a motivation for dening a new game,
alled safety resiliene game, between the reovery meh-
anism (the protagonist) and the error-injeting agent (the
antagonist). The game is speied with a set F of failure
states, a set S of safe states (the safety region), the moves
by the antagonist to injet errors, and the resiliene level
k that the designers want to ahieve. The objetive of the
protagonist is to identify a ontrol strategy so that the whole
system an ahieve the presribed level (or the highest level)
k of resiliene for safety regionS (a set of states) and failure
state set F .
The game is played round by round. When the antago-
nist issues an error move, the play may be deeted into a
reovery segment. If there are no more than k   1 errors
in the reovery segment, then a k-resilient ontrol meha-
nism must diret the reovery segment to end at a safe state.
The above observation suggests that a safety region an be
abstrated as a xed point to the reovery proedure that
transforms a safe state to another safe state via the reovery
segment with at most k   1 errors. Coneptually, a xed
point to a proedure f(x) is a set S of elements in the do-
Figure 2. Illustration of the reovery operation
main of x suh that S = ff(x) j x 2 Sg. To alulate
the xed point of the reovery proedure, we an use the
greatest xed point algorithm. The idea is to start from a
superset of the reovery proedure xed point. For onve-
niene, we all a superset of the xed point a pseudo xed
point (PFP). Then we iteratively hek every state q in the
PFP and eliminate q from the PFP if, after at most k errors
from q, the reovery mehanism either annot avoid failure
or annot diret the system bak to the PFP. As the iterative
heking and elimination goes on, the PFP will shrink and
eventually stabilize. Note that its size is always nite, sine
the initial PFP must be no bigger than Q. The nal PFP is
then a greatest xed point to the reovery mehansim for
k-resiliene and is the legitimate safety region.
This reovery proedure an be illustrated as in Figure 2
for resiliene to 2 errors. In this gure, the states in set
S
0
are omputed as the preondition of states in S through
those transitions in the gure. Eah path from S
0
to S is a
reovery segment. S and S
0
may overlap. The blue irles
represent states in the reovery segments. If we alulate
S
0
out of S, then, for eah state q
0
2 S
0
, we an nd a
path from q
0
2 S
0
via a path in the reovery segment to
another state q 2 S. The maximal number of errors in a
reovery segment is 2. Thus the protagonist has a strategy
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to reover from errors in S
0
to S even when 2 errors happen
in the orresponding reovery segment. When S
0
= S, then
S is a xed point to the preondition operator through the
reovery segments in the gure.
Now we formally dene the onept that we explained
with Figure 2.
Denition 4 (k-safety): Given a k 2 N, a state q is alled
k-safe with respet to a safety region S  Q r F of non-
failure states, denoted q 2 sfrh
k
(S), if there is a strategy
for the protagonist to guarantee that we an reah bak to
S from q, provided that the overall ount of errors is at most
k. 
However, the denition an be subtle in its interpreta-
tion. Speially, the ability to stand against one wave of
k errors is not the same as that against repeated reovery
from waves of k errors. If the reovery mehanism is not
designed properly, the system may gradually lose a bit of
ontrol after eah wave of k errors and eventually degrade
to system-level failure.
Example 4 (Fault-tolerant omputer arhitetures):
Consider Example 1 with 2k + 1 proessor opies, with
the objetive to maintain majority heks and to identify
the bad proessors. Indeed, aording to the rst, na
¨
ve
solution, any safe state with a reovery strategy toQrF is
good. After k proessor opies fail, the majority heks are
still apable to maintain the orretness of the ombined
behavior to follow the design of the original system. There
seems to be nothing to do after k errors. Thus, na
¨
vely,
we an hoose those states as the safety region if, at those
states, majority heks still work.
However, there is no expetation that the system will be
1 2 3 4
Figure 3. An example for alulating sfrh
k
able to reover at any point in the future into a situation
where it an bear another wave of k errors. It will fail and
lose the funtion of majority heks just after one more er-
ror. In ontrast, in this work, we aim to propose a dense er-
ror resiliene riterion that given no more errors for enough
time to allow reovery, the system will eventually reover to
resiliene to k dense errors again. 
To look at this issue in more detail, please onsider the
transition system with four states, inluding a single fail-
ure state (state 4, marked by a double line) shown in Fig-
ure 3. The ontrolled transitions are depited as blak solid
arrows, the error transitions are depited as red dashed ar-
rows. For S = Q r F = f1; 2; 3g, all states in S are in
sfrh
0
(S). For all k  1, we have sfrh
k
(S) = f1; 2g:
the protagonist an simply stay in f1; 2g during the safety
phase of the game, and one the antagonist plays an error
transition, the game progresses into the reovery segment,
where the protagonist's objetive is satised immediately.
This outlines the differene between k-sfrh-ty and the lin-
ear time property of being able to repeatedly tolerate waves
of up to k errors, whih would only be satised by states 1
and 2 for k = 1, and only for state 1 for k = 2.
This differene raises the question if the rules of our
game are depriving the antagonist of some of the k errors
that she should intuitively be allowed to insert in a wave.
The answer is that this is not the ase if we use any xed
point of sfrh
k
as S. In this ase, the protagonist would
regain the apability to endure a wave of k errors when
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reahing a safe state after reovery. Instead of depriving
the antagonist, one ould say that we reset the number of
errors in any reovery segment that the antagonist an in-
jet to k. Thus suh a xed point of sfrh
k
should onsist
of states, from whih we an use a ontrol mehanism to
fend off repetitive waves of k dense errors in the reovery
segments. For onveniene, we all states in suh a xed
point of sfrh
k
the k-resilient states.
For a state to be in sfrh
k
(S), the system (protagonist)
has a strategy to reover to S, given that a long enough ex-
eution ommened without another round of k errors hap-
pening. We say that two suessive errors are in the same
group of dense errors if the sequene of states separating
them was not long enough for reovery to the safety re-
gion. Vie versa, if two suessive errors are far enough
apart suh that the protagonist an guarantee reovery in
this separation, then they do not belong to the same group.
To hek whether reovering to S by the protagonist (the
fault-tolerane mehanism) is always possible, provided
that at most k errors ourred during a reovery segment,
observe that nesting sfrh
k
one, i.e., sfrh
k
(sfrh
k
()), or-
responds to tolerating up to two rounds of up to k dense
errors, and so forth. Thus, for S to be a target of reov-
ery for k-resiliene, S must be a xed point of the operator
sfrh
k
from Denition 4, or, equivalently, S = sfrh
k
(S)
must hold. Moreover, if S is the greatest xed point to k-
resiliene, then we we an apply sfrh
k
() any number of
times to S and still obtain S. Computationally, the greatest
xed point of sfrh
k
an be onstruted as by exeuting
sfrh
k
(sfrh
k
(sfrh
k
(: : : sfrh
k
(S

: : :))),
using a sufiently deep nesting that a xed point is
reahed.
Note that this xed point x to x = sfrh
k
(x) is what we
are really interested in, while sfrh
k
(S) for a given S is an
intermediate result that does not guarantee survival of the
systems after waves of dense errors. If this greatest xed
point
R =
[
fX  S j X = sfrh
k
(X)g
is non-empty, the protagonist's strategy for the xed point
(guaranteeing eventual reovery to a state in the xed point
within no more than k errors, i.e., k-resiliene) an be used
to ontrol the reovery mehanism, onstraining its transi-
tions to follow its winning strategy.
As explained in the introdution, there an be several
natural ontrol problems in our safety resiliene game.
First, the system designers may want to know whether the
hosen safety region S an be supported by the reovery
mehanism for resiliene level k. Seond, they may want to
get design support for hoosing the safety region for ahiev-
ing resiliene level k. Finally, they may want to know the
maximal resiliene level that they an ahieve.
With the explanation in the above, in the rest of the
manusript, we will fous on the algorithm for onstrut-
ing sfrh
k
() and evaluating k-resilient states.
4 Safety resiliene games
A system is k-resilient if it an be ontrolled to toler-
ate innitely many groups of up to k dense errors, provided
that the system is given enough time to reover between
these groups. As we have explained, in systems developed
with defensive mehanism against errors, when errors are
deteted, reovery proedures should be ativated. The ma-
jor hallenge is to deide given a set of failure states and
a safety region, whether the reovery mehanism an sup-
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port a resiliene level required by the users. Our goal is
to develop tehniques with a solid foundation to assist the
system designers in evaluating the resiliene of their sys-
tems, to synthesize the ontroller strategy for the required
resiliene level, and to ahieve the maximal resiliene level.
We now formally dene the safety resiliene game
played between a system (the protagonist) and an error-
injetor (the antagonist). Initially, the two players are given
a 2-player onurrent game struture K, a pebble in r, a set
F  Q of failure states, and a safety region S  Q r F .
Then the reovery region onsists of states in Qr (F [ S).
The two players together make deisions and move the peb-
ble from state to state. The antagonist tries to deet a
play into F by injeting sufiently many errors, while the
protagonist tries to avoid that the pebble reahes F . To
ahieve this, the protagonist an use the reovery region as
the safety buffer and try to get bak to S as soon as the play
is deeted from S to the reovery region. If a system is
resilient to k errors, then it means that the protagonist an
handle up to k 1 errors while in the reovery region. Thus
when heking whether a system is resilient to k errors, we
only need to hek those reovery segments with no more
than k   1 errors.
In the following, we formalize the onept.
Denition 5 (Safety resiliene game struture): Suh a
struture is a pair hK; F i with the following restritions.
 K is a 2-player onurrent game struture
hQ; r; P; ; E
1
; E
2
; Æi. Coneptually, the rst
player represents the system / the protagonist, while
the seond player represents the error model / the
antagonist.
 E
2
is partitioned into error and and non-error moves
E
error
andE
noerr
, respetively. We require that only the
2nd player an issue error moves. Moreover, E
noerr
must be non-empty.
 F is the set of failure states in Q with r 62 F .
The antagonist an hoose if she wants to respond on a
move of the protagonist with an error move. We allow for
different non-error moves to reet `normal' nondetermin-
isti behavior, e.g., aused by abstration. We allow for dif-
ferent error moves to reet different errors that an our
in the same step.
We sometimes refer to transitions with error moves by the
antagonist as error transitions and to transitions with noerr
moves by the antagonist as ontrolled transitions.
For a party A  f1; 2g, we refer with A = f1; 2g nA to
the players not in the party, and by E
A
to the moves made
by the players in A, that is, E
f1;2g
= E
1
E
2
, E
f1g
= E
1
,
et.
The antagonist an use both error and non-error moves
to inuene the game. In a simple setting, the antagonist
may only have the hoie to insert error-moves, while there
is only a single ontrolled transition. In this simple ase, the
protagonist an hoose the suessor state alone unless the
antagonist plays an error transition. Speially, a safety
resiliene game struture is simple if E
2
ontains only one
error move. Considering simple safety resiliene game
strutures leads to lower omplexities, as it hanges redu-
tions from reahability in games (PTIME-omplete [26℄) to
reahability in graphs (NL-omplete [33℄). 
Note that, in the game struture, only one system player
and one error model player are allowed. This is purely for
the simpliity of algorithm presentation. With proper re-
dution tehniques, we an easily onvert a game struture
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with more than one system player and more than one error
model player to the struture in Denition 5. The standard
tehnique would be using the transition rules of the prod-
ut automata of the system players for the protagonist while
using the transition rules of the produt automata of the er-
ror model players for the antagonist. In fat, we indeed use
this redution tehnique in our experiment for analyzing the
resiliene levels of multi-agent systems.
From now on, we assume that we are in the ontext of a
given safety resiliene game struture G = hK; F i.
Denition 6 (Reovery segements): We need to rigor-
ously dene reovery segments. A play prex  is a reov-
ery segment to safety region S  Q r F if it satises the
following onstraints.
 (0) 2 S.
 If jj =1, then all states in [1;1) are inQr (S [
F ). In this ase,  is alled a failed reovery segment.
 If jj 6= 1, then all states in [1; jj   2℄ are in Qr
(S [ F ) and last() = (jj   1) is either in F or
S. If last() 2 F ,  is also a failed reovery segment;
otherwise, it is a suessful one.
We use level(; S) to denote the number of error moves
between states in  with respet to the safety region S:
level(; S)
def
=


fi 2 [0; jj   1) j 
e
(i) j= E
error
g


. 
As stated in the introdution, we propose a game-
theoreti foundation for resiliene analysis of software sys-
tems. With this perspetive, the protagonist ats as a maxi-
mizer, who wants to maximize the resiliene levels along all
plays. For this, the protagonist xes a strategy that desribe
what he is going to do on eah play prex. The antagonist
ats as a minimizer, who wants to minimize the resiliene
level. She an resolve nondeterminism and injet errors in
order to ahieve this, and (although this plays no major role
in this setting) she knows the strategy the protagonist has
xed and an use this knowledge in priniple.
The goal of the protagonist is therefore the same as the
goal of the system designer: to obtain a strategy that offers
a maximal level of resiliene in a safety game. However,
in order to avoid degenerate behavior where the protagonist
benets from being in the reovery phase and from the an-
tagonist therefore being allowed less errors in the urrent
wave of errors she may injet, we have to strengthen his
obligation to eventually reover to the safe states when the
environment hooses not to injet further errors. This way,
the protagonist has no inentive to yle in the reovery re-
gion. Consequently, he an reover to the safe region within
jQj moves after the antagonist has inserted the last error
of the urrent wave, irrespetive of whether the antagonist
would be allowed to insert further errors in this wave. This
is the key reason why memoryless optimal ontrol exists
for this error model, why it is reasonable to assume swift
reovery, and, onsequently, why it is a posteriori justied
to leave the separation time between two waves impliit: the
time to traverse jQj states sufes.
Besides obtaining this from intuition, we an also on-
sider the tree of suessful reoveries for any protagonist
strategy that an endure k error moves by the antagonist.
The tree of reoveries from up to k errors is nite aord-
ing to the denition of suessful reovery segments. Then
for any subtree t in this tree of reoveries with a node v in
t suh that v is labeled with the same state as the root of t
with no error on the path, we an always replae t with the
subtree rooted at v. After the replaement, we have a tree of
reoveries with no greater depth than the original one. Af-
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ter repeating suh replaements, this immediately provides
a translation from suh a strategy with unrestrited memory
to one with memory of size k (the resiliene level). The
restrition to memoryless strategies follows from the on-
strution we give in Setion 6, whih does not depend on
the memory and still yields a strategy, whih is memory-
less. Thus, in this work, we should dene the resiliene
level of software systems based on memoryless protagonist
strategies.
Based on the argument above, the gain of the protagonist
in a play an be dened as follows.
Denition 7 (Gain): Given safety region S  Qr F , the
gain of a play  to S, in symbols gain(; S), denotes the
maximal integer k 2 N suh that, for all reovery segments

r
to S in , if level(
r
; S)  k, then 
r
is a suessful
reovery segment to S. 
The resiliene level of a safety resiliene game is dened
as the maximum gain that the protagonist an guarantee in
all plays with a memoryless strategy.
Denition 8 (Safety resiliene game): Suh a game is
zero-sum and dened on a safety resiliene game struture
G = hK; F i and a safety region S  Q r F . The gain
of G to S, in symbols gain(G; S), is dened as the maxi-
mum gain that the protagonist an manage with memoryless
strategies. Rigorously,
gain(G; S)
def
= max
2
(0)
min

0
2
gain(play(r; ; 
0
); S)
Please be reall that play(r; ; 
0
) is the play from r aord-
ing to strategies  and 
0
respetively of the two players.
Moreover 
(0)
is the set of memoryless strategies.
We say that the resiliene level of G to S is
gain(G; S). A strategy ! for the protagonist is
optimal to S if min

0
2
gain(play(r; !; 
0
); S) =
max
2
(0)
min

0
2
gain(play(r; ; 
0
); S). When S is
not given, we say that G is k-resilient if there exists a
non-empty S  Q n F with gain(G; S)  k. 
Remark. While the option of using memoryless strategies
plays a minor role in the tehnial argument, it plays a
paramount role in the usefulness of the resulting ontrol
strategy: hoosing memoryless strategies implies that all
reovery segments are short. In partiular, all sub-paths (re-
overy segments) between two waves of dense errors in-
jeted by the antagonist are shorterand usually signi-
antly shorterthan the size of G. In onsequene, any time
span long enough for traversing the reovery segment will
lead to a full reovery. It is therefore sufient for a tempo-
ral distane we have to assume between two waves of dense
errors.
5 Alternating-time -alulus with events
(AMCE)
We propose to solve our resiliene game problems with
an existing tehnology, i.e., model-heking of alternating-
time -alulus (AMC) formulas. AMC is a propositional
temporal logi with xed point operators. For example, the
following formula
X:(safe _ h1i X) (A)
uses least xed point operator to delare a xed point vari-
ableX for a set of states. Subformula h1i  existentially
quanties over the protagonist strategies that an diret the
plays to a suessor state satisfying . Together, the for-
mula speies a set X of states that an indutively reah a
safe state with the ontrol of the protagonist. Speially,
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the formula says that a state is inX if either it is safe or the
protagonist an diret to a suessor state known to be in
X . For our game strutures, we only need strategy quanti-
ation of up to two players.
However, we need extend AMC with some simple syn-
tax sugar. There are two extensions. The rst is for Boolean
ombinations of path modalities in the sope of strategy
quantiation. For example, the following AMCE formula
h1i((smoke )alarmOn) _windowClosed) (B)
says that the protagonist an enfore either of the following
two path properties with the same strategy.
 If there is smoke, then the alarm will be turned on in
the next state.
 The window will always be losed in the next state.
Suh a formula is not in ATL and AMC [3℄.
The seond extension is for restriting transitions that
may partiipate in the evaluation of path formulas. The re-
strition is via onstraints on moves on transitions and an,
in our extension to AMC, be speied with a move sym-
bol set to the next-state modal operators. For example, the
following AMCE formula
h1i((
2:error
alarmOn) ^ (
:2:error
:alarmOn)) (C)
says that the protagonist an
 turn on the alarm when an error ours; and
 keep the alarm silent when no error ours.
Before we formally present AMCE, we need dene expres-
sions for onstraints on moves of players in transitions. We
adapt an idea from [44℄. Speially, a move expression 
is of the following syntax.
 ::= a : e j 
1
_ 
2
j :
1
Here, a is a player index in f1; 2g and e is a move symbol
in E
1
[E
2
. _ and : are standard disjuntion and negation.
Typial shorthands of Boolean operations an also be de-
ned out of _ and :. A total move vetor an be expressed
as [e
1
; e
2
℄ where for all a 2 f1; 2g, e
a
2 E
a
is the move
by player a speied in the vetor. We say [e
1
; e
2
℄ satis-
es , in symbols [e
1
; e
2
℄ j= , if and only if the following
onstraints are satised.
 [e
1
; e
2
℄ j= a : e if, and only if, e
a
is e.
 [e
1
; e
2
℄ j= 
1
_ 
2
if, and only if, [e
1
; e
2
℄ j= 
1
or
[e
1
; e
2
℄ j= 
2
.
 [e
1
; e
2
℄ j= :
1
if, and only if, [e
1
; e
2
℄ 6j= 
1
.
5.1 Syntax
A formula  in AMCE has the following syntax.
 ::= p j X j 
1
_ 
2
j :
1
j X:
1
j hAi 
 ::= j  
1
_  
2
j : 
1
j 


1
Here,  is a state formula, is a path formula, p is an atomi
proposition symbol in P (atomi proposition set, as in Def-
inition 1), and X is a set variable for subsets of Q. The
Boolean onnetors are the ommon ones: _ for disjun-
tion and : for negation. Note that we allow for Boolean
ombinations of the next operators under strategy quan-
tiation hAi. This is one major differene of AMCE from
AMC.
Formula X:
1
is the usual least xed point operation
to 
1
. Aording to the tradition in [3℄, we require that
all free ourrenes of X in 
1
must our within an even
number of sopes of negations. This is beause sentenes
with a negative ourrene, like X::X , have no natural
semantis. A set variable X is bound in a formula  if it
is inside a delaration sope of X . If it is not bound, then
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it is free. An AMCE sentene is an AMCE state formula
without free set variables. In most ases, we are interested
in speiations given as AMCE sentenes.
The A in hAi is a nite set of player indies in [1; 2℄.
Coneptually, hAi means that players in A an ollabo-
rate to make  true. For example, hf1; 2gi p means that
players 1 and 2 an ollaborate to make p true in the next
state. We follow the notations in [3℄ and omit the paren-
theses in formulas like hAi . For example, hf2gi  p and
hf1; 2gi p will be abbreviated as h2i  p and h1; 2i p
respetively.
We allow event restritions as supersripts in


1
with
a move expression . The operator is important in support-
ing the evaluation of safety resiliene levels with traditional
model-heking tehnology. Note that sine AMC [3℄ only
allows for the next-state temporal modality, only the hoie
of moves to the next states of a strategy matters. Formula



1
is thus evaluated at states with respet to move ve-
tors satisfying onstraint . The formula is true of a move
vetor [e
1
; e
2
℄ if and only if [e
1
; e
2
℄ j=  implies the sat-
isfation of  at state Æ(q; e
1
; e
2
). Also 
1:E
1

1
an be
written as 
1
in AMC [3℄ and the supersript to  an
be omitted.
We also adopt shorthands in the below. The  refers to
state or path formulas.
true
def
= p _ :p
false
def
= :p ^ p

1
^ 
2
def
= :((:
1
) _ (:
2
))

1
) 
2
def
= (:
1
) _ 
2
X:
def
= :X::
[A℄ 
def
= :hAi: 
5.2 Semantis
In the following, we adapt the presentation style of [3℄ to
dene the semantis of AMCE indutively over the stru-
ture of the subformulas. The value of a state formula at
a state is determined by the interpretation of the set vari-
ables. Suh an interpretation I maps set variables to sub-
sets of Q. In omparison, the value of a path formula at
a state is determined by both the interpretation of the set
variables and the move vetor hosen by the players. For
onveniene and oniseness of presentation, we extend the
denition of interpretation of [3℄ also to reord the hosen
move vetor by some players. Speially, we use an auxil-
iary variable move for the present hosen move vetor in
the evaluation of path formulas. Given an interpretation I ,
I(move) reords the hosen move vetor of all players in I .
For example, I(move) = [setAlarm;?℄ means the ho-
sen move vetor that player 1 sets on an alarm while player
2 does nothing under interpretation I .
We need the following onept for ollaborative hoies
of moves to the next states by some players. An enfored
move vetor set by A  [1; 2℄ is a maximal set of move
vetors that agree on the hoies of moves by players with
indies in A. Speially, given an enfored move ve-
tor set C by A, we require that, for every [e
1
; e
2
℄ 2 C,
[e
0
1
; e
0
2
℄ 2 C, and a 2 A, e
a
= e
0
a
. For onveniene, we let
 
A
denote the set of all enfored move sets by A.
Following the semantis style of [3℄, we an extend I
to be an interpretation of all state and path formulas. Intu-
itively, given a state or path formula , I() is the set of
states that satisfy  aording to the assumption on values
of set variable values and auxiliary variable move. More
preisely, I() is a subset of Q that satises the following
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indutive rules.
 I(p) = fq j p 2 (q)g.
 I(
1
_ 
2
) = I(
1
) [ I(
2
).
 I(:
1
) = Q  I(
1
).
 I(X:
1
) is the smallest set Y  Q with Y = I [X 7!
Y ℄(
1
), where I [X 7! Y ℄ is a new interpretation iden-
tial to I exept thatX is interpreted as Y .
 I(hAi ) is the set of states suh that there is an en-
fored move vetor set C by A suh that, for all move
vetors  2 C, I [move 7! ℄( ) holds:
I(hAi ) =
S
C2 
A
T
2C
I [move 7! ℄( )
 Given I(move) = [e
1
; e
2
℄, if [e
1
; e
2
℄ j= , then
I(


1
) = fq 2 Q j Æ(q; e
1
; e
2
) 2 I(
1
)g; other-
wise I(


1
) = Q.
A onurrent game struture is a model of an AMCE sen-
tene , if its initial state r is in the interpretation of 
(r 2 I()) for any interpretation I .
Note that, stritly speaking, AMCE does not add muh
to the expressiveness of AMC. In the literature, propositions
have often been used to reord events. Intuitively, we would
need one atomi proposition for eah event to mark that it
has just ourred. This event marker would be true exatly
at states right after the event happened. (One would possi-
bly have to reate multiple opies of states to reet this.)
As disussed in [43℄, suh a modeling tehnique leads to
an unneessary blow up of the state spae, whih ould be
exponential in the number of players in general onurrent
games. By properly seleting the transitions with respet
to operators like 

, suh auxiliary propositions are not
neessary when enoding the state spae. Thus, AMCE an
also be of interest to pratitioners for the efient analysis
and veriation of general onurrent games.
6 Resiliene level heking algorithm
In Subsetion 3.2, we have proposed the idea of the
sfrh
k
() operator and proposed to use its greatest xed
point for the evaluation of k-resiliene. In the following,
we rst establish some properties of k-safety and then use
AMC model-heking tehnology to solve the safety re-
siliene games.
6.1 High­level desription of the algorithm
The following lemma shows the sufieny of k-safety
as a building blok for solving safety resiliene games.
Lemma 5 For a safety resiliene game G, sfrh
k
() has a
greatest xed point.
Proof : The lemma follows from the fats that the fun-
tion sfrh
k
is monotoni (S  S
0
implies sfrh
k
(S) 
sfrh
k
(S
0
) beause a winning strategy for the protagonist
for S is also a winning strategy for S
0
for all states in
sfrh
k
(S)) and operates on a nite domain. 
For the example in Figure 3, onsidering S = f1g
(f1g = sfrh
2
(f1; 2; 3g)), the only state in S, state 1, is 2-
resilient: it an reover with the reovery strategy to always
go to the left.
The set of k-resilient states of G, an be alulated as the
greatest solution to S = sfrh
k
(S) with S  Qr F . Teh-
nially we an start the indutive alulation of the greatest
xed point from base ase S
0
= Q r F , and suessively
alulate S
i+1
= sfrh
k
(S
i
), for eah i  0. The set of
k-resilient states is then the limit S
1
. As soon as we have
S
i+1
= S
i
, a xed point is reahed. We then have S
i
= S
1
and an stop the indutive onstrution. Sine S
0
is nite
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and S
i+1
 S
i
holds for all i  0, we will eventually reah
a j with S
j+1
= S
j
= S
1
.
6.2 Realization with AMCE model­heking
We need formally dene the interation among strategies
of players. We borrow the notation of funtion omposition.
Given two partial funtions 
1
and 
2
, we use 
1
Æ 
2
to
represent their omposition. Speially, we have the fol-
lowing denition.

1
Æ 
2
(a) =


1
(a) if 
2
(a) is undened:

2
(a) otherwise
For our purpose, a partial strategy vetor is a mapping from
f1; 2g to  and an be undened for some players in f1; 2g.
It is for a party A  f1; 2g if it is dened only for players
in A and represents a ollaborative strategy of the players
with a dened strategy in A. It is total if it is dened for all
players.
For onveniene, we also dene partial move vetors as
mappings from f1; 2g to E. A partial move vetor is for a
party A  f1; 2g if it is dened only for players in A. It
is total if it is dened for all players in f1; 2g. Given two
partial move vetors 
1
and 
2
, we dene 
1
Æ
2
to represent
the omposition of the two vetors.
Given an S, we propose to onstrut sfrh
k
(S) in an in-
dution on k. We need the following preliminary onepts
for the presentation.
Denition 9 (Traps) For A  f1; 2g, a trap for A is a sub-
set Q
0
 Q that party f1; 2g r A has a strategy vetor
 to keep all plays from leaving Q
0
. Formally, we require
that, for every q 2 Q
0
and partial move vetor  for A,
there exists a partial move vetor 
0
for f1; 2g r A suh
that Æ(q;  Æ 
0
(1); : : : ;  Æ 
0
(m)) 2 Q
0
. 
6.2.1 Base ase, sfrh
0
(S)
In the base ase, sfrh
0
(S) haraterizes those states, from
whih the protagonist an diret the plays to S and stay
there via a protagonist strategy when there is no error in-
jeted by the antagonist. Thus sfrh
0
(S) is the greatest trap
for the antagonist to S when no error happens and the great-
est solution to the following equation.
X =

q




q 2 X \ S; e 2 E
1
;
8e
0
2 E
2
(e
0
6= noerr) Æ(q; e; e
0
) 2 X)

.
In AMCE, we an alternatively dene sfrh
0
(S) as follows.
sfrh
0
(S)
def
= X:(S ^ h1i 
:2:error
X).
This is the usual safety kernel of S, whih onsists of those
states, from whih any ontrolled transition is safe. It an
be omputed by the usual greatest xed point onstrution.
Lemma 6 sfrh
0
(S) an be onstruted, together with a
suitable memoriless ontrol strategy, in time linear to the
size of G.
Proof : A state q 2 S an stay in sfrh
0
(S) if there is a
hoie e 2 E
1
suh that for all f 2 E
2
, Æ(q; e; f) 2
sfrh
0
(S). Basially, we an use the typial approah of
iterative elimination to alulate sfrh
0
(S). That is, we rst
let K
0
= Q  S. Then we a sequene of mutually disjoint
sets K
1
;K
2
; : : : ;K
i
; : : : suh that for all i  1, states in
K
i+1
an be shown to be not in sfrh
0
(S) by evidenes of
states in K
i
[ : : : [ K
0
. Linear time an be ahieved with
areful book-keeping of the hoies of moves at all states
in S. We need a ounter 
q
for eah q 2 S initialized to
jE
1
j for the initial number of andidate hoies of moves.
Then for eah [q; e℄ 2 SE
1
, we need a Boolean ag b
[q;e℄
initialized to true to represent that f[e; f ℄ j f 2 E
2
g is still
a valid hoie of moves at q to satisfy sfrh
0
(S). For eah
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Table 2. Algorithm for sfrh
0
(S) by iterative
elimination
sfrh
0
(S)
1: for q 2 S do 
q
= jE
1
j end for
2: for q 2 S; e 2 E
1
do b
[q;e℄
= true end for
3: Let i = 0 andK
0
= Q  S.
4: whileK
i
6= ; do
5: LetK
i+1
= ;.
6: for q 2 K
i
and [q
0
; e; f ℄ 2 L
q
do
7: if b
[q
0
;e℄
is true then
8: Let 
q
0
= 
q
0
  1.
9: if 
q
0
is 0 then add q
0
toK
i+1
. end if
10: end if
11: Set b
[q
0
;e℄
to false.
12: end for
13: Inrement i by 1.
14: end while
15: return S   (K
0
[ : : : [K
i
).
state q, we also need to maintain a list of transition soure
states. That is, for eah Æ(q
0
; e; f) = q, we need reord
[q
0
; e; f ℄ in list L
q
. Then the iterative elimination proeeds
as the algorithm in table 2. The algorithm is linear time
sine eah transition Æ(q; e; f) is heked exatly one. 
6.2.2 Indutive ases, sfrh
k
(S)
Now we explain how to dene the indutive ases of
sfrh
k
(S). The ondition is for those states from whih
plays an be direted to S via a reovery segment in Q r
(S [ F ) with k or less errors injeted by the antagonist. An
intermediate step for the onstrution of k-sfrh states is the
onstrution of an attrator that ontrols, through ontrolled
moves, the play prexes to stay in a subset L  Q r F of
non-failure states. As only ontrolled (non-error)moves are
allowed, this is merely a bakward reahability one.
The ontrolled limited attrator set of a set X for a lim-
ited regionL  Q, denoted one
L
(X) is the set fromwhih
there is a protagonist strategy to move to X without leav-
ing L and errors injeted by the antagonist. Tehnially,
one
L
(X) is the least solution to equation:
Y = X [

q




q 2 L; e 2 E
1
;
8e
0
2 E
2
r ferrorg(Æ(q; e; e
0
) 2 Y )

.
The ontrolled limited attrator set one
L
(X) an be on-
struted using simple bakward reahability for X of on-
trolled transitions through states of L. In AMCE, this an
be onstruted as follows.
one
L
(X)
def
= Y:(X _ (L ^ h1i 
:2:error
Y ))
Note that the protagonist must use the same move irrespe-
tive of the move of the antagonist to both stay in L and
approahX , provided that the antagonist does not injet an
error.
The ontrolled limited attrator set one
L
(X) is used in
the onstrution of sfrh
k
(S). We further onstrut a de-
sending hain V
0
 V
1
 : : :  V
k 1
of limited attrators
V
i
. From V
i
we have an attrator strategy towards S for the
protagonist, whih an tolerate up to i further errors. The
respetive V
i
are attrators that avoid failure states. More-
over, from a state in V
i
with i > 1, any error transition leads
to V
i 1
.
A state q 2 Q is fragile for a set B  Q if, for all moves
of the protagonist, at least one of its suessors is outside
of B. (The intuition is that this is an error move, and for
simple safety resiliene game strutures, we an restrit the
denition to failure states.) The set of fragile states for B is
frag(B)
def
= fq j 8e 2 E
1
9e
0
2 E
2
(Æ(q; e; e
0
) =2 B)g.
In AMCE, we have the following formulation of frag(B).
frag(B)
def
= [1℄:B.
Tehnially, it is, however, easier to onstrut its dual
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Qr frag(B) = h1i  B.
This dual an be onstruted using a ontrolled bakward
reahability to B with any strategy of the protagonist.
The limited regions L
i
of states allowed when approah-
ing S also form a desending hain L
0
 L
1
 : : :  L
k
.
Using these building bloks, we an ompute the k-sfrh
states as follows. The states in L
i+1
are the non-failure
states from whih all error transitions lead to a state in V
i
.
The sets V
i
ontain the states from whih there is a on-
trolled path to S that progresses through L
i
; all error tran-
sitions originating from any state of this path lead to V
i 1
.
V
0
is therefore just the set of states from whih there is a
ontrolled path to S.
From all states in V
k 1
, the protagonist therefore has an
optimal strategy in the reovery segment of the game de-
sribed earlier: if the antagonist an play at most k   1
errors, then the protagonist an make sure that S is reahed.
Starting with L
0
def
= Q r F that haraterizes ones on
the way to S without any errors, we dene the V
k
's andL
k
's
indutively by
L
k
def
= L
0
r frag(Qr one
L
k 1
(S)),
In AMCE, this an be dened indutively as follows.
L
0
def
= :F
L
k
def
= L
0
^ h1i  one
L
k 1
(S):
Finally, we hoose sfrh
k
(S)
def
= sfrh
0
(S \ L
k
). In
AMCE, this an be expressed as follows.
sfrh
k
(S)
def
= sfrh
0
(S ^ L
k
).
6.2.3 Algorithm for the set of k-resilient states
Finding a ontrol strategy for k-sfrh ontrol within
sfrh
k
(S) is simple: as long as we remain in sfrh
k
(S) =
sfrh
0
(S \ L
k
), we an hoose any ontrol move that does
not leave sfrh
k
(S). One sfrh
k
(S) is left through an er-
ror transition to V
k 1
; V
k 2
; :::, we determine the maximal
i for whih it holds that we are in V
i
and follow the attrator
strategy of one
L
i
(S) towards S.
In summary, we present our algorithms for the set of k-
resilient states in Table 3. In fat, we have presented two
algorithms. The rst onstruts sfrh
k
(S), whih an be
used for heking whether the safety region S provided by
the users is indeed a good one. The way to do it is to simply
hek whether S is a solution to sfrh
k
(x) = x.
Then our seond algorithm alulates res
k
(G) as the
greatest xed point S of sfrh
k
(:) as the reommendation
for the safety region:
res
k
(G) =
[
fS  Q j S = sfrh
k
(S) and S [ F = ;g:
In this way, the users do not have to alulate and provide
the safety region, whih would be error prone. Aording to
the argument and lemmas from above, we get the following
theorem.
Theorem 7 G is k-resilient if, and only if, r 2 res
k
(G). 
6.3 Complexity
A rough omplexity of our resiliene level heking al-
gorithm straightforwardly follows the omplexity of AMC
model-heking. Speially, the following lemma ex-
plains the maximal resiliene level that we need onsider.
For onveniene, let k
max
be the maximal resiliene level
of G.
Lemma 8 k
max
is either innite or no greater than jQrF j.
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L0
def
= :F
L
k
def
= :F ^ h1i  y:S _ (L
k 1
^ h1i 
error
y ^L
k 1
)
sfrh
0
(S)
def
= x:(S ^ h1i 
error
x)
sfrh
k
(S)
def
= sfrh
0
(S ^ L
k
)
res
k
(G)
def
= S:((Qr F ) ^ sfrh
k
(S)) : the set of k-resilient states
Table 3. Algorithm for k­resilient states
Proof : We assume that k
max
is greater than jQ r F j but
not innite. This means that there exists a failed reov-
ery segment  with k + 1 errors injeted by the antagonist.
Sine the protagonist an only use memoryless strategies,
there must be two position indies i < j < jj   1 with
(i) = (j) in the reovery segment suh that at (i) and
(j), the protagonist makes the same move while the antag-
onist makes different moves. This implies the existene of
a shorter failed reovery segment [0; i℄[j+1; jj 1℄. By
repeating the above argument, we an eventually identify a
failed reovery segment of length  jQ r F j that ontra-
dits the assumption and establishes the lemma. 
With Lemma 8, we an use the omplexity of AMC
model-heking problem [3℄ to straightforwardly establish
theO(k
max
jEj)
2
= O(jQrF jjEj)
2
omplexity of res
k
(G)
when k is k
max
. In the following, we present a more
detailed analysis of the omplexity of our resiliene level
heking algorithm. All individual steps in the onstrution
(intersetion, differene, predeessor, and attrator) are lin-
ear in the size of the safety resiliene game, and there are
O(k) of these operations in the onstrution. This provides
a bi-linear (linear in k and jGj) algorithm for the onstru-
tion of sfrh
k
and a strategy for the protagonist.
Lemma 9 A memoryless ontrol strategy for the states in
sfrh
k
(S) an be onstruted in time linear in both k and
the size jGj of the safety resiliene game G. 
The onstrution of res
k
(G) uses the repeated exeution
of (Q r F ) ^ sfrh
k
(). The exeution of sfrh
k
() needs
to be repeated at most jQ r F j times until a xed point is
reahed, and eah exeution requires at mostO(k jGj) steps
by Lemma 9.
For the ontrol strategy of the protagonist, we an sim-
ply use the ontrol strategy from sfrh
k
(S
1
) from the
xed point S
1
. This ontrol strategy is memoryless (f.
Lemma 9).
Lemma 10 res
k
(G) and a memoryless k-resilient ontrol
strategy for res
k
(G) an be onstruted inO(kjQrF jjGj)
time. 
Finding the resiliene level k
max
for the initial state r re-
quires at most O(log k
max
) many onstrutions of res
i
(G).
We start with i = 1, double the parameter until k
max
is
exeeded, and then use logarithmi searh to nd k
max
.
Corollary 11 For the initial state r, we an determine the
resiliene level k
max
= maxfi 2 N j r 2 res
i
(Q r F )g
of r, res
k
max
(Q r F ), and a memoryless k
max
-resilient
ontrol strategy for res
k
max
(Q r F ) in O(jQ r F j  jGj 
k
max
log k
max
) time. 
Simple safety resiliene game strutures. For simple
safety resiliene game strutures, heing if a state is in
sfrh
0
(S) is NL-omplete.
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Lemma 12 Testing if a state is in sfrh
0
(S) is NL-
omplete.
Proof: NL ompleteness an be shown by redution
to and from the repeated ST-reahability [33℄ (the question
whether there is a path from a state S to a state T and from
T to itself in a direted graph).
Likewise, the ontrolled limited attrator set one
L
(S)
an be onstruted using simple bakwards reahability
for G of ontrolled transition through states of L. For
A = one
L
(S), determining whether a state is in A is NL-
omplete (see [33℄).
The omplexity of determining whether or not a state q
is in sfrh
k
(S) thus depends on whether or not we onsider
k to be a xed parameter. Considering k to be bounded (or
xed) is natural in our ontext, beause k is bounded by the
redundany.
Lemma 13 For a xed parameter k, testing if a state s of
a simple safety resiliene game strutures is in sfrh
k
(S) is
NL-omplete.
Proof: Testing if a state is in L
0
is in NL. By an indu-
tive argument, we an show that
 provided that testing if a state is in L
i
is in NL, we an
test if a state is in A
i
= one
L
i
(S) by using the non-
deterministi power to guess a path towards S, while
verifying that we are inL
i
in every state we pass before
S is reahed; and
 if we an hek if a state is in A
i
in NL, then we an
hek if it is in Q r A
i
[27℄, in frag(Q r A
i
) (with
one nondeterministi transition), and in L
i+1
= L
0
r
frag(S rA
i
) [27℄ in NL.
Testing that a state is in S \ L
k
is therefore in NL and
testing if it is in sfrh
0
(S\L
k
) redues to guessing a state t
in sfrh
k
(G) and an ST path (a path from s to t followed by
a loop from t to t), verifying for all states on the path that
they are in S \ L
k
.
For hardness, note that the last step of the onstrution
alone is NL-omplete (Lemma 6).
If k is onsidered an input, then reahability in AND-OR
graphs an easily be enoded in LOGSPACE: It sufes to
use the nodes of an AND-OR graph as the states, the out-
going edges of OR nodes as the result of the hoie of the
protagonist only (while the move of the antagonist has no
inuene on the outome, no matter whether or not she in-
dues an error), and to model the AND nodes as a state,
where the no-error move of the antagonist will lead in y-
ling in the state, while the antagonist an hoose the su-
essor from the graph when induing an error. Choosing k
to be the number of nodes of the AND-OR graph and F to
be the target nodes of the AND-OR graph, the target nodes
of the AND-OR graph are not reahable from a state s iff
s 2 sfrh
k
(Qr F ).
Given that reahability in AND-OR graphs is PTIME-
omplete [26℄, this provides:
Lemma 14 If k is onsidered an input parameter, then test-
ing if a state s of a simple safety resiliene game strutures
is in sfrh
k
(S) is PTIME-omplete. 
The omplexity of res
k
(S) is (almost) independent of the
parameter k:
Theorem 15 The problem of heking whether or not a
state s is k-resilient for a set S is PTIME-omplete for all
k > 0 and NL-omplete for k = 0.
22
Proof: We have shown inlusion in PTIME in
Lemma 10. For hardness in the k > 0 ase, we an use
the same redution from the reahability problem in AND-
OR graphs as for sfrh
k
(S).
For k = 0, sfrh
0
(G) = sfrh
0
 
sfrh
0
(G)

implies
res
0
(G) = sfrh
0
(G). The problem of heking if a state is
in res
0
(G) is therefore NL-omplete by Lemma 12.
Hardness for general safety resiliene game strutures.
For general resiliene game strutures, we an again use a
LOGSPACE redution from the reahability in AND-OR
graphs: We again use the nodes of an AND-OR graph as
the states, and the outgoing edges of OR nodes are se-
leted based on the hoie of protagonist only. For the AND
nodes, we leave the hoie to the antagonist only, whithout
the need to invoke an error. (That is, errors play no role in
this redution. The antagonist may be allowed to insert one,
but she an always obtain the same transition without doing
so.)
Marking F as the target nodes, we get res
k
(Q r F ) =
sfrh
l
(Q r F ) for all non-negative integers k; l, and s 2
sfrh
0
(Q r F ) iff the target nodes of the AND-OR graph
are not reahable from s. With Lemmas 9 and 10, we get
the following theorem.
Theorem 16 For all k  0, the problems of heking
whether or not a state s is in res
k
(QrF ) and res
k
(QrF ),
respetively, are PTIME-omplete for general safety re-
siliene game strutures.
7 Tool implementation and experimental re-
sults
In the following, we report our implementation and ex-
periment with our onstrutions. Our implementation is
based on symboli on-the-y model-heking tehniques
and built on the simulation/model-heking library of
REDLIB in https://github.om/yyergg/Resil
for fast implementation. Our implementation and benh-
marks an also be found in the same page.
We adopt CEFSM (ommuniating extended nite-state
mahine) [7℄ as a onvenient language for the desription
of abstrat models of our onurrent game strutures. A
CEFSM onsists of several nite-state mahines extended
with shared variables for the modeling of shared memory
and with synhronizations for the modeling of message-
passing in distributed systems. This is justiable sine the
fault-tolerant algorithms may themselves be subjet to re-
stritions in onurrent or distributed omputation. Indeed,
we found CEFSM very expressive in modeling the benh-
marks from the literature [12, 38℄.
The translation from our CEFSMs to state transition sys-
tems, suh as nite Kripke strutures, is standard in the lit-
erature. All state spaes, onditions, preonditions, post-
onditions, xed points, et., are represented as logi for-
mulas. The logi formulas are then implemented with
multi-value deision diagrams (MDD) [32℄.
We then took advantage of the support of REDLIB for
writing down template automatas for onstruting omplex
models. We speied a template automata with REDLIB to
desribe the moves of the players. Coneptually, the player
automatas are onstruted as an instane of the template au-
tomata. Then the whole game struture is onstruted as the
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produt of all player automatas. Finally, we use the API of
REDLIB to do on-th-y onstrution of the game struture
whih an be advantageous sine unreahable states will
never be generated.
7.1 Benhmarks
We use the following ve parameterized benhmarks to
hek the performane of our tehniques. Eah benhmark
has parameters for the number of partiipating modules in
the model. Suh parameterized models ome in handy for
the evaluation of the salability of our tehniques with re-
spet to onurreny and model sizes.
1. We use the example of a fault-tolerant omputer arhi-
teture (Example 1) as our rst benhmark. An im-
portant feature of this benhmark is that there is an as-
sumed mehanism for deteting errors of the modules.
One an error is deteted, a proessor an be assigned
to reover the module, albeit to the ost of a redued
redundany in the exeutions.
2. Voting is a ommon tehnique for fault tolerane
through repliation when there is no mehanism to de-
tet errors of the modules [36℄. In its simplest form, a
system an guarantee orretness, provided less than
half of its modules are faulty. This benhmark im-
plements this simple voting mehanism. Every time
a voting is requested, the modules submit their ballots
individually. Then we hek how many module fail-
ures the system an endure and reover.
3. This is a simplied version of the previous voting
benhmark, where we assume that there is a blak-
board for the lient to hek the voting result.
4. Pratial Byzantine fault-tolerane (PBFT) algorithm:
We use an abstrat model of the famous algorithm by
Castro and Liskov [12℄. It does not assume the avail-
ability of an error-detetion mehanism but uses vot-
ing tehniques to guarantee the orretness of ompu-
tations when less than one third of the voters are faulty.
This algorithm has impat on the design of many pro-
tools [2, 14, 15, 23, 29℄ and is used in Bitoin [1℄, a
peer-to-peer digital urreny system.
5. Fault-tolerant lok synhronization algorithm: Clok
synhronization is a entral issue in distributed om-
puting. In [38℄, Ramanathan, Shin, and Butler pre-
sented several fault-tolerane lok synhronization
algorithms in the presene of Byzantine faults with
high probability. We use a nondeterministi abstrat
model of the onvergene averaging algorithm from
their paper. The algorithm is proven orret when no
more than one third of the loal loks an drift to eight
time units from the median of all lok readings.
7.2 Modeling of the fault­tolerant systems
Appropriate modeling of the benhmarks is always im-
portant for the efient veriation of real-world target sys-
tems. Many unneessary details an burden the veriation
algorithm and blow up the omputation, while skethymod-
els an then give too many false alarms and miss orret
benhmarks. We have found that there is an interesting as-
pet in the modeling of the above benhmarks. Repliation
and voting are ommonly adopted tehniques for ahiev-
ing fault-tolerane and resiliene. Suh fault-tolerant al-
gorithms usually onsist of several idential modules that
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use the same behavior templates. This observation implies
that the identity of individual modules an be unimportant
for some benhmarks. For suh benhmarks, we an use
ounter abstration [20, 31℄ in their models. Speially,
with ounter abstration, we an model all system players
with one player that keeps a ounter (l) for eah ontrol
loation l in the template automatas. Then at a state of the
whole game graph, (l) reords the number of system play-
ers at loation l. With this tehnique, a system with m   1
system player and one error model player is then redued to
two players: one ounter-abstration player for all the sys-
tem players and one remaining error model player. If a sys-
tem player enters a loation l in a global transition, then in
the model, (l) is inremented by one in the abstrat global
transition. If a system player leaves l in the global transi-
tion, then (l) is deremented by one in the abstrat global
transition. But the suession of loation movements of a
partiular player is omitted from the abstration.
We found that we an use ounter abstration to prove
the orretness of benhmarks 1, 2, and 3. In ontrast, the
PBFT and the lok synhronization algorithms use oun-
ters for eah module to model the responses reeived from
its peer modules. As a result, we deided not to use ounter
abstration to model these two algorithms in this work.
In the following, we explain how to apply our tehniques
to analyze the resiliene levels of the avioni systems in Ex-
ample 1. The appliation is ahieved in three steps. We rst
model the system under analysis either as a plain CEFSM
or with ounter abstration (if our analysis tool annot han-
dle the omplexity of the plain CEFSM). We then build the
produt automaton of the CEFSM as the resiliene game
struture exept for the move vetors. Finally, we onvert
the labels on the transitions of the produt automaton to
move vetors of the two players. Note that the moves may
not orrespond to the transition labels of the CEFSM.
Step 1: the onstrution of the CEFSM
We rst present the CEFSM model template of Exam-
ple 1 in Figure 4. The CEFSM model has n proessors
and m memory modules. Figures 4(a) and (b) are for the
abstration of proessors and memory opies, respetively.
The ovals represent loal states of a proessor or a memory
module, while the arrows represent transitions. The transi-
tions of a CEFSM are labeled with `error', `C' (for Con-
trol), or `R' (for reovery).
We also use synhronizers to bind proess transitions.
For example, when a memory module moves into a faulty
state, an idle proessor may issue an fd (error-deteted)
event and try to repair the module by opying memory on-
tents from normal memory modules. Suh error-detetion
is usually ahieved with standard hardware. Note that the
benhmarks are models that reet the reovery meha-
nism, abstrating away the details of the original systems.
A entral issue in the design of this reovery mehanism
is then the resiliene level of the ontrolled systems. We
need three synhronizers: fd for error detetion by a pro-
essor, rs for reovery suess, and rf for reovery failure.
The three synhronizers are used to bind a transition from
a proessor and another from a memory module into a syn-
hronized transition. For example, a proessor at state pidle
and a memory module at state mfaulty may simultaneously
enter their popy andmopy states respetively through syn-
hronizers !fd (for sending the synhronizer) and ?fd (for
reeiving). We also onveniently use a variable q in this
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Figure 4. CEFSM templates of n proessors and m memory opies
synhronized transition to apture the identier of the mem-
ory module reeiving the synhronizer. A transition without
synhronization labels is onsidered a trivial synhronized
transition. The transition system of the CEFSM operates
with interleaving semantis at the abstration level of the
synhronized transitions.
For ounter abstration, we need four global variables
rp, fp, rm, and fm respetively to keep trak of the num-
bers of running proessors, faulty proessors, runningmem-
ory modules, and faulty memory modules. We also need a
loal variable idm for eah proessor to reord the faulty
memory module identier that the proessor is responsible
for reovery. We label the ontrollable, error, and reovery
transitions respetively with `C', `error', and `R'. We also
label eah transition with synhronizers and ations. At any
moment, the proessors and the memory modules may en-
ter their running states, exeute a task, and generate the out-
ome. A proessor starts its exeution from state prunwhile
a memory module starts from state mrun.
Step 2: building the produt automata
The produt automata is a Kripke struture whose states
are of is a vetor [p
1
; : : : ; p
n
; i
1
; : : : ; i
n
; s
1
; : : : ; s
m
℄ of 2n+
m elements. For all k, p
k
and i
k
respetively represent the
urrent loation and the urrent idm value of proessor k
while s
k
represents the urrent loation of memory mod-
ule k. Then interleaving semantis that eah time only a
global transition (a single loal proess transition without
synhronizers or two loal proess transition bound by a
synhronizer) is exeuted is adopted to determine the transi-
tion relation from one state to another. Suh tehniques are
standard in model onstrution. REDLIB an help in this
regard by onstruting the Kripke struture in an on-the-y
style to avoid the onstrution of those states not reahable
from the initial state.
Step 3: the labeling of the move vetors
After the seond step, we have the game struture ready
exept for the move vetors on the transitions. We use
E
1
= fC;R; nopg, where nop represents no operation,
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and E
2
= fnoerr; errorg. Then we use the following three
rules to label move vetors.
 Every global transition with one omponent loal pro-
ess transition labeled with error is labed with move
vetor [nop; errorg.
 Every global transition with a omponent loal proess
transition labeled with R is labeled with move vetor
[R; noerr℄.
 All other global transitions are labeled with move ve-
tor [C; noerr℄.
Counter abstration of the example
We also use the CEFSM in gure 4 to explain ounter
abstration. We need eight ounter variables: pr, pi, p, pf,
mr, mi, m, andmf to respetively reord the number of pro-
esses in loation prun, pidle, popy, pfaulty, mrun, midle,
mopy, and mfaulty in a state. Then the ounter abstration
of the CEFSM is in Figure 5. The initial state are speied
with onstraint: pr = n^ pi = 0^ p = 0^ pf = 0^mr =
m^mi = 0^m = 0^mf = 0 on the ounters. The state in
the produt automata must satisfy the following onstraints:
pr+ pi+ p+ pf = n^mr+mi+m+mf = m. As an be
seen, we do not are whih proessor is in the idle mode, in
the running mode, et., in this abstration. Similarly, we do
not are whih memory module is in the idle mode, in the
running mode, and et. The loal state transition only keeps
traks of the number of proessors in eah mode and the
number of memory modules in eah mode. We also do not
are whih proessor is in harge of the reovery of whih
memory module. Suh an abstration an be done automat-
ially.
The labeling of the move vetors on the transitions in
the Kripke struture (produt automaton) follows the same
rules for the produt automaton from the CEFSM in Fig-
ure 4.
Analysis of the game struture
The majority outome of the proessors and memory
opies is used as the outome of the system. A proessor
may enter the faulty state. A memory module may also en-
ter the faulty state. Proessors may ontrol to reover them-
selves or a faulty memory module by opying the ontents
of a funtioning memory module to the faulty one. At any
moment, we want to make sure that we an always reover
to a global ondition with the following two restritions.
 There are at least two more proessors in the running
mode than the proessors in the faulty mode.
 There are at least two more memory opies in the run-
ning mode than memory opies in the faulty mode.
Together, the failure ondition is rp fp < 2_rm fm <
2. That is, all states in the transition system satisfying rp 
fp < 2 _ rm  fm < 2 are in set F .
Tool implementation and the benhmarks used in the
experiment an all be found in our Soureforge REDLIB
projet at https://github.om/yyergg/Resil.
7.3 Performane data
We report the performane data in Table 4 for the re-
siliene algorithms desribed in Setion 7.1 against the pa-
rameterized benhmarks in the above with various parame-
ters. The seond olumn shows the onurreny sizes. The
third olumn shows the values of k for the rows. The fourth
and fth olumns show the sizes of the onurrent game
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Figure 5. Counter abstration of the CEFSM templates of n proessors and m memory opies
strutures. The sixth and seventh olumns show the time
and spaes used to alulate sfrh
k
(). Similarly, the eighth
and ninth olumns show the time and spaes for alulating
the res
k
().
The benhmark in Figure 4 does not have nodes in
sfrh
2
(G) and res
2
(G). So we hanged the benhmark to
see how we hek our implementation with k > 1. The
hange is that the reovery transition from state popy to pi-
dle of proessors are relabeled as ontrollable. This hange
signiantly limits the ability of the system errors to derail
the system. For the avionis system, the resiliene level k is
set to one less than half the number of proessors. For the
voting and simple voting benhmarks, the value of k is set
to one less than half the number of replias (voters). For the
PBFT and lok synhronization algorithm, we hoose k to
be one less than one third of the number of replias.
The performane data has been olleted with a Virtual
Mahine (VM) running opensuse 11.4 x86 on Intel i7 2600k
3.8GHz CPU with 4 ores and 8G memory. The VM only
uses one ore and 4G memory.
The time and spae used to alulate resiliene is a lit-
tle bit more than that to hek for sfrh. The reason is that
sfrh
k
is a pre-requisite for alulating res
k
. In our exper-
iment, sfrh
k
is usually very lose to res
k
and does not re-
quire muh extra time in alulating res
k
out of sfrh
k
.
The experiments show that our tehniques sale to real-
isti levels of redundany. For fault-tolerant hardware, usu-
ally the numbers of replias are small, for example, less than
10 replias. Thus our tehniques seem very promising for
the veriation and synthesis of hardware fault-tolerane.
On the other hand, nowadays, software fault-tolerane
through networked omputers an reate huge numbers of
replias. Our experiment shows that ounter abstration an
be a useful tehniques for the modeling and veriation of
software resiliene. Speially, for the avionis benh-
mark, we an verify models of muh higher onurreny
and omplexity with ounter abstration than without.
8 Related work
We have applied game-based tehnqiues [13, 34, 37℄ for
synthesizing a ontrol mehanism with maximal resiliene
to software errors. The synthesis of ontrol strategies is es-
sential in solving games with temporal and !-regular ob-
jetives. For these more omplex objetive, synthesis goes
bak to Churh's solvability problem [13℄ and inspired Ra-
bin's work on nite automata over innite strutures [37℄
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Table 4. Performane data for resiliene alulation s: seonds; M: megabytes
benhmarks onurreny k game sizes sfrh
k
res
k
#nodes #edges time memory time memory
avionis 2 proessors & 2 memory modules 2 118 750 0.62s 114M 0.85s 116M
2 proessors & 3 memory modules 2 414 3252 0.94s 139M 1.10s 153M
3 proessors & 3 memory modules 3 1540 15090 4.67s 225M 8.38s 267M
3 proessors & 4 memory mdules 3 5601 63889 42.86s 815M 155s 846M
avionis 6 proessors & 6 memory modules 2 1372 6594 2.89s 129M 3.54s 516M
(ounter 7 proessors & 7 memory modules 3 2304 11396 10.7s 216M 23.4s 808M
abstration) 8 proessors & 8 memory modules 3 3645 18432 43.8s 1009M 135s 2430M
voting 1 lient & 20 replias 9 9922 23551 7.01s 260M 36.7s 297M
1 lient & 26 replias 12 20776 49882 19.9s 474M 79.6s 611M
simple 1 lient & 150 replias 74 458 1056 0.71s 159M 31.7s 219M
voting 1 lient & 200 replias 99 608 1406 1.06s 161M 162s 337M
1 lient & 250 replias 124 758 1756 1.36s 163M 307s 499M
PBFT 1 lient & 6 replias 2 577 897 0.34s 72M 1.05s 193M
1 lient & 9 replias 4 2817 4609 13.3s 564M 58.5s 1657M
lok 1 lient & 15 servers 7 16384 229376 45.1s 3075M 62.4s 3264M
syn 1 lient & 17 severs 8 65536 1070421 870s 14725M 915s 15433M
and Bu¨hi and Landweber's works on nite games of in-
nite duration [10,11℄. A righ body of literature on synthesis
has sine been developed [6, 18, 22, 30, 35, 39,40℄.
Traditionally, fault tolerane refers to various basi fault
models [6℄, suh as a limited number of errors [28℄. These
traditional fault models are subsumed by more general syn-
thesis or ontrol objetives [5, 6, 42℄; as simple objetives
with pratial relevane, they have triggered the develop-
ment of speialized tools [18, 22℄.
Dijkstra's self-stabilization riterion [4, 16℄ suggests to
build systems that eventually reover to a `good state', from
where the program ommenes normally. Instead of on-
struting a system to satisfy suh a goal, one might want to
apply ontrol theory to restrit the exeution of an existing
system to ahieve an additional goal. Our ontrol objetive
is a reovery mehanism for up to k errors. After reov-
ery, the system has to tolerate up to k errors again, and so
forth. In this work, we suggest a mehanism to synthesize
a reovery mehanism for a given fault model and reovery
primitives.
In [17℄, an interesting notion of robustness based on
Hamming and Lewenstein distane related to the number
of past states is dened. It establishes a onnetion between
these distanes with a notion of synhronization that har-
aterizes the ability of the system to reset for ombinatorial
systems. In [9℄, `ratio games' are disussed, where the ob-
jetive is to minimize the ratio between failures indued by
the environment and system errors aused by them.
Besides using our simple game model that neither refer
diretly to time, nor to probabilities, one an also onsider
models that make these aspets expliit. Their analysis is
far more omplex (with [21℄ offering the best omplexity
bounds), and so are the resulting strategies. If we, for ex-
ample, return to the example of airplanes with an opera-
tion time of 20 hours referred to in Table 1, then an optimal
timed model would take the remaining operation time into
aount. When the remaining time is two minutes, the bal-
ane between being resilient against waves of two errors
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and being resilient against 5 errors looks very different, and
the optimal ontrol would hange over time rather than be-
ing stati. Another impliation of more omplex models
would be that the error model would have to be more de-
tailed. Even if one assumes that a simple onept like safe
states persists, it depends on the neties of suh a model if
a two step path bak to it where an error after step one leads
to system failure is preferable over a muh longer path, say
through 10,000 intermediate states, where one error an be
tolerated during reovery.
We believe that the independene from suh details is an
advantage of our tehnique, partly beause it is simpler and
heaper, and partly beause the further advantages one an
obtain frommore detailed error models rely heavily on very
knowledge of (or, realistially, on very detailde assumptions
on) how errors are distributed.
In [8, 19℄ the resiliene model we have introdued [25℄
has been applied for synthesising robust ontrol in an
assume-guaranee setting to produe robustness against o-
asional nonompliane of the environment with the as-
sumptions of its behavior.
9 Conlusion
We have introdued an approah for the development of
a ontrol of safety ritial systems that maximizes the num-
ber of dense errors the system an tolerate. Our tehniques
are inspired by the problem of ontrolling systems with re-
dundany: in order to deet the effet of individual er-
rors, safety ritial systems are often equipped with multi-
ple opies of various omponents. If one or more ompo-
nents fail, suh systems an still work properly as long as
the orret behavior an be identied.
This has inspired the two-phase formulation of the safety
resiliene problems in this artile. In the rst phase, we
identify a k-resilient region, while we develop a ontrol
strategy for reovery in the seond phase. After an error,
the ontroller an reover to the k-resilient region without
enountering a system failure, unless the error is part of a
group of more than k errors that happen in lose suession.
Suh a reovering strategy is memoryless. Being memo-
ryless on a small abstration in partiular implies that the
reovery is fast.
The system an, one reovered, tolerate and reover
from k further dense errors, and so forth. Consequently,
our ontrol strategy allows for reovery from an arbitrary
number of errors, provided that the number of dense errors
is restrited. This is the best guarantee we an hope for: our
tehnique guarantees to nd the optimal parameter k. This
parameter is bound to be small (smaller than the number of
redundant omponents). Optimizing it is omputationally
inexpensive, but provides strong guarantees: the likelihood
of having more than k errors appear in short suession af-
ter an error ourred are, for independent errors, exponen-
tial in k. As errors are few and far between, eah level of
resiliene gained redues the likelihood of system-level fail-
ures signiantly.
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